Refer to the second page of the Course Survey for instructions on submitting written work on Gradescope.

**Written problems**

1. Textbook exercise 3.22 (3.21 in 1st edition) (Pollard’s algorithm examples)
2. Textbook exercise 4.2 (7.2 in 1st edition) (RSA signature examples)
3. Textbook exercise 4.6 (7.5 in 1st edition) (ElGamal signature examples)
4. Textbook exercise 4.7 (7.6 in 1st edition) (ElGamal “blind signatures”)

**Programming problems**

1. Implement Pollard’s factoring algorithm, and use it to attempt to break 96-bit RSA encryption. More specifically: you should write a function `pollardRSA(N, e, c)` that takes an RSA public key \((N, e)\) and ciphertext \(c\), and attempts to extract the plaintext. For the grading test-cases, I have generated 96-bit RSA moduli *without making any effort to choose strong primes*; as a result, some of these moduli are more susceptible to Pollard’s algorithm than others. However, many cases will not be unusually susceptible to Pollard, so *for full points on this problem your code only needs to solve 10 of the 50 test cases.* But you may enjoy trying variations on Pollard’s algorithm (or another factoring algorithm altogether) to see how many test-cases you are able to solve. I will enable an “leaderboard” on Gradescope to show the five highest scores obtained (your real name will not be used if you don’t wish to use it; Gradescope will allow you to choose a pseudonym for the leaderboard).

The sample cases (from the testing notebook) will include a few smaller cases to help debug your program, then ten 96-bit cases that I have specifically chosen to be susceptible to Pollard. So the sample cases will give you a sense of whether Pollard’s algorithm is implemented well, but don’t necessarily indicate that it will pass all of the cases on Gradescope.

2. We’ve discussed in class the need for choosing primes \(p\) such that \(p - 1\) has a large prime factor, and also mentioned that it is also a good idea to ensure that \(p + 1\) also has a large prime factor (for reasons we won’t discuss). In this problem, you will write a function `strongPrime(qbits, pbits)` to construct such a prime. You will be given integers `qbits` and `pbits`, and should return 3 prime numbers \(q_1, q_2, p\) such that both \(q_1\) and \(q_2\) are at least `qbits` bits long, \(p\) is exactly `pbits` bits long, and such that \(q_1 \mid (p - 1)\) and \(q_2 \mid (p + 1)\). As with last week’s `makeQP` problem, I recommend choosing the subordinate primes \(q_1, q_2\) first, and using these to narrow the search for the last prime \(p\).

3. This problem concerns a modular arithmetic problem that we have not yet considered, but which is important to the last programming problem. You will be given integers \(m, b, N\), and your goal is to solve the congruence \(mx \equiv b \pmod{N}\) for \(x\). When \(m\) is relatively prime to \(N\), this is accomplished by multiplying by the inverse of \(m\); you should figure out how to solve such a congruence in cases where \(m\) may have common factors with \(N\). It is possible that no solutions exist. If solutions exist, they can all be described in a single congruence \(x \equiv r \pmod{M}\), where \(r, M\) are integers and \(M\) is not necessarily the same as \(N\). Write a function `linearCong(m, b, N)` that either returns `None` if no solutions exist, or returns a pair \((r, M)\) describing the general solution if solutions do exist.

due Wednesday 4/3 by 10pm.
**Problem Set 7**

*Hint:* re-write the original congruence as an equation with one more variable, and try to convert it to a congruence (possibly with a different modulus) in which the coefficient of $x$ is invertible.

4. When using ElGamal digital signatures, it is essential that Samantha always generates her ephemeral key at random (much like in ElGamal encryption). In this problem, you will study why it is particularly dangerous to use the same ephemeral key twice. You will be given the public ElGamal parameters $p, g$, Alice’s public key $A$, two documents $d_1, d_2$, and valid signatures $(s_{11}, s_{12}), (s_{21}, s_{22})$ for the two documents (respectively). The two signatures were generated using the same ephemeral key. Write a function $\text{extractKey}(p, g, A, d_1, s_{11}, s_{12}, d_2, s_{21}, s_{22})$ that extracts and returns Alice’s private key $a$ from this information.

*Hint:* if you carefully manipulate the two congruences Samantha used to sign the documents, you can derive a congruence of the form $ma \equiv b \pmod{p-1}$, where $m$ and $b$ are values you can compute and $a$ is the private key that you are trying to find. Unfortunately, it is possible that $m$ is not invertible modulo $p - 1$. You can use the solution to the previous problem to “solve” this congruence to obtain a congruence that may not determine $a$ uniquely; you’ll need to figure out how to get from here to the specific value of $a$. 

*due Wednesday 4/3 by 10pm.*